法律 AI // 资讯总览
需要被持续追踪的
法律 AI 信号。
本期索引按监管、判例、实务与研究归档;可依主题或关键字定位已发布记录。
法律 AI // 资讯总览
本期索引按监管、判例、实务与研究归档;可依主题或关键字定位已发布记录。
原题: Endorsement Without New Evidence: How Sequential Voting Inflates Mandates in Online Community Governance
研究基于维基百科管理员选举中198275条自由文本理由,提出“投票—文本分歧”指标,识别决定性投票却理由单薄、顺从先前几的情况。结果显示,分歧随投票者后到上升,在控制固定效应后仍成立;一旦纳入既有文本,到达顺序不再预测分歧,累积先前证据成为关键,且在共同投票网络边缘投票者中最强。不过该分歧不预测晋升后的管理活跃度或留任结果,说明公开计票可能削弱审查信号,即便仍能选出胜任管理者。
展示来源全文,完整内容以原文页面为准。
arXiv:2609.09321v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Online communities often treat large support margins in public elections as strong mandates. We argue that such margins can overstate the independent scrutiny behind a decision. Using 198,275 free-text rationales from Wikipedia admin elections, we introduce vote-text divergence, a measure that flags a decisive vote paired with a thin, deferential rationale. Divergence rises as voters arrive later, even after controlling for voter and election fixed effects. The pattern is consistent with information saturation: once prior text is accounted for, arrival order no longer predicts divergence, while accumulated prior evidence does. The effect is strongest among peripheral voters in the co-voting network. Yet divergence does not predict worse post-promotion outcomes, such as administrative activity or survival. Public tallies can therefore weaken the scrutiny signal even while selecting capable administrators: a margin may appear to reflect more consensus and support than it actually contains.
公开高支持率是否可能掩盖独立审查不足并虚增治理授权。
文书与研报规范引注
《顺序投票放大在线社区治理授权》(来源: arXiv cs.CY,发布日期: 2026/09/12,访问链接: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09321)